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Tape I, pl 
Present: Congressmen Thomas Raibsback (TR), Wali,er:-Flowers (WF), James Mann 
(JM), Hamilton Fish (HF), Caldwell Butler (CB), R8y Thornton (RT), and William 
Cohen (WC); Donald Shea (re), ThlZlnas Mooney (TM), and Stephen Lynch (SL). 
Site: Board Room, Sea Pines Plantation, Hilton Head Island, s.c. 
Time: Friday, July 11, 1975, 9:50am. 
00 - There are going to be three sessions, or really two and a quarter: this 
morning we thought we would spend pretty much on the dra-.~s of the articles, 
following this eight page outline [Attached]. We can L"'Xtersperse a.rvthng 
you wnat, of course. Then tonight we have a cocktail hour starting over 
in rq place at 6:00. Mr. Mann suggested that about 6:.30 we-the ten or 
us-va.lk out of there, leaving women and children-and waifs there, and we 
come over here for about a hal.! hour, and having had a !w drinks, we 
would be even more relaxed. 
WF - He looks like he's had a few already. 
LAUGHTER 
HF - Here comes Jim 1".ann now. 
00 - To quote him, he thought we might have a half hour or so very informal 
session, especially for color. I think Tom Railsback has a good point 
here-we mentioned that in the ear last night-that ve may have a lot- of 
information, but i! this ever gets to the publishing stage, I think. it. 
does lack a kind of human element, and so the more you can ~all of. that 
-and I think JJOU will do that spontaneously-the more the better. ·so 
the second session is tonight, very informally. Then the third is to-
morrow at this hour-a ha.1! hour be!'ore this hour-at. 9:30, and I thought 
we'd do two things then: spend most of the time on some or the points o! 
di!'!erence that emerged from tour individual interrews with Steve and 
Tom and ie. And then perhaps the last half hour simply asking the ques-
tion, where do we go from here? Because I think that now we are all to-
gether, we ought to disc~s that question. Now I wilI turn this over to 
Mr. Mooney trho is running this part, and to Mr. Railsback and a.nrone else. 
TM - Does everyone have the eight page outline? What I intend to do here is 
to note all the recollections that I had of the meetings that I attended. 
Generally- my idea is to categorize all dra..tts into three areas: each 
draft has an introduction-this is not the preamble, but the introduction 
to the specifics of each draft. Second, specific charges or.e thru nine, 
A thru I, or whatever. And third, each draft has a conclusion. And these 
three areas vere being const..antly ~vised throughout the couple or days 
that the so-called coalition met. 
But the purpose oI the outline and having the dra.f'te close by ie just to 
spark discussion, to get into this thing, to try to move .thru the outline 
as a kind or guide to get thru all the articles. This may help to set 
the stage and get 1our m:inms back to that particular time !rame. 
9 , 
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TM - Also you will have close by a chronology of the crucial days, the meeting 
days, which might be hslpful to look at, as we move thru this. 
00 - Thlfre are also copies of the Dear drafts here. 
CB - Yes, that is one or the things that has been missing. Did we get the 
Doar drafts on a Saturday or a Friday? 
JM - In the old black notebook, and there were five sets •••• 
00 - And they- are all here. You received them on Friday, July 19th. 
JM - And I think we all fair~ well ignored them. 
CB - Well, we nad the11 and saw nothing to justify retaining them. 
TR - Nothing to commend them. 
WF - I don't think I even read them. 
JM - I guess we need a little more information about the actual sources of 
these drafts because one was by the impeachment staff, one or more, one 
was b;y Brooks, and I don't know real.ly the source of the others. But 
the;y weren't all by the official staff, like Broob said. 
HF - Was his included in here about SanClemente [ ?] 
JM - '!fee, I am not sure about that. 
TR - Did Brooks do that by himself'? 
JM - I think Brooks did it himself. 
00 - Here is the Brooks drafts. (Xerox copies on table J. 
WC - Could I go back one step before that first meeting? T was going thru some 
notes that I made during the ti.me on July 18th. We had baseball practice, 
Tom, at 8 o'clock and 10 o •clock. I think it was the second time I had 
talked with you during the entire proceeding, Walter, and I know you (TR] 
had talked with Flowers and Mann. They would like to get together with 
six to eight people and discuss inf orma.lly the sta.rnim!ds tp be used, 
evidence, etc. 
WF - And that was just standing in the committee room •••• 
JM - I remember precisely- the way it was: we were standing between the two 
aisles Lin the Committee RoomJ. 
., 
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WC - And Flowers says, I want to be sure we are not going to lose this thing 
on the noor if I vote for impeachment. You got to have a solid case. 
Mann says we got 98'.£ or the evidence. Flowers saia, you may have 105~ 
of the evidence, because some of this could never be used as evidence in 
the Senate. That was the line of' conversation, which we then discussed. 
I said that thffe are only two areas of impeachment, agency abuse and 
obstruction of justice. Jim Mann agreed. Not Cambodia, allowances L? J, 
not the sale of ambassadorships--that has been done by every administration. 
That was stal"Jding right there in front of the cOIIIDittee room. 
WF - On the Republican side. 
JM - Ncr, it was on the Democratic side. 
HF - No, ~it was on the Democratic side. 
CB - I don't remember being present at that conversation. 
JM - No, you weren't. 
WC - I said I · had some problems with the wiretaps being left for 22 months. 
Walter said that they would have been derelict if they didn't try to 
plug the leaks and then Mann and Flowers and I left so we could get back 
together withOllt the hard cores. And you mentioned something, Walter, 
Kalmbach made a case on milk[?] •••• 
WF - You're jogging rq mind. That same day, at a subsequent roll call, you 
apparaently mentioned that conversation to Caldwell Butler, because the 
next ime the committee reconvened and I sat out, Caldwell got up and came 
over to me and said something about maybe we are going to have a meeting 
-some words to that ef'f ect. Do you remember? 
CB - I remember initiating a conversation with you sometime, but rrr:, recollection 
is that .I would have been talking with Cohen all the time. I also had 
a conversation with Jerry W'aldie. Yott told me, riding over in the trolly 
one day about the meeting-after the Doar articles came out. 
JM - Yea, it was. 
CB - That. llight n.n been alt.er the W'aldie conversation. 
JM - At that time I do not know i1' he had talked to the Democratic members •••• 
WF - One interesting thing-I can't put a date on it. In talking to Waldie, 
who sat next to me, when I was particularly troubled and di.dnft really 
have any ideas who was backing what two or three weeks from the date we 
finally put it together,' I asked, "Jerry, howmany are·:going to vote for 
impeachment?" He said, "I figure 26 or 27." And I remember how- ·ridiculous 
I felt that was then. I felt that was absolutely absurd. 
Ll.UGHTER 
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TR - What day was July 18, we we had our informal conversation? 
1l5 - That was a Thursday, because the Dear articles came out on the 19th, 
a Friday. 
CB - That makes better sense. The 24th is the following Wednesday, when 
the TV debates started. 
DS - And the coalition, as such, met .for the first time on Tuesday the 23rd. 
WF - I think that Monday night when you [ JMJ and I and Ray were together 
after the Democratic caucus meeting earlier, we talked for a couple of 
hours over in your office-which was really the frist time that .the 
three of us had ever talked together formally. We all had talked 
round about it. I had leaned over to you [RT] and Jim and. I would 
walk back and forth together, but I think at that point the three of 
us were amazed hov close together our thinking was on the whole thing. 
We excluded the same things and we included the same thing!!. 
TR - When was that now? 
WF - Monday aj.ght before our Tuesday morning meeting in your office. 
TR - Do you remember when you came over to me-I think it was on a Monday 
after our business--and you said, "Rails, why don't you get some guys 
together?" Or something like that •••• 
WF - It was inevitable that we have a meeting soon because we didn't have 
any tapes to sit on. 
LAUGHTER 
HF - That was the .first time, Tom, you talked? You were the one who talked 
to them in the committee room? 
TR - Yeah, we had been meeting. It was that day that Walter came over and 
said, "Why- don't you get some guys and I will get some guys and we'll 
meet and talk about it?" 
RT - Walter, ju.st before that meeting, we had our Democratic caucus. I 
know it was amazing how closely we were on track. And at that caucus, 
you remember there were still some strong discussion by some Democrats 
about Cambodia and about taxes and everything and I read from a draft 
I had before me of the areas of concern that worried me. c~orge 
Danielson asked for a copy of it. He got it and made a Xerox. This 
was the first dra.f't I had worked on sometime over that weekend and maybe 
on Monday morning it was actually being typed up. Now because of the 
dissatisfaction with the Dear work and then as a result of this you [JMJ 
suggested, I believe, or Walter, we ought to sit down and discuss it. 
And that is as I recall the meeting: not my draft but a discussion of 
the aeeas of concern that we shared. This led to the meeting in your 
office. 
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JM - Two little items of interest. In spite of our chit•chat during the 
previous two weeks when things had .kinda sta...-ted jelling, we never made 
a committment to each other, or had expressed arr, indication, frankly, 
as to what we were going to do. We just knew ·11e were thinking that it 
was disturbing us all in the same way-the same things were disturbing us. 
I had an interview Friday, a couple of days ago, with the little fellow 
with the glasses that represents Newsday ••• Mike ·l'faldman. He proably 
came to see most of us to get recollections a year later. But he 
reminded me that on Saturday when the Judiciary Committee had its 
informal session, he ran into you [WF] and me in the cafeteria, and 
at that point I ahd told him that we were going to start to work on some 
articles of our own. 
WF - Yeah, I remember that now; I had forgotten that. 
VC - And that Saturday there were only two or three Republicans around. 
HF - You had a cha~e to look at the articles prepared by the inquiry staff 
and perhaps thought they were not satisfactory-? 
JM - I have to admit it is my nature to start from scratch men ram doing 
something, and so I didn't go back to look at these things and compare 
them with even what we ended up doing. But we met and we so quickly 
jelled on what the issues were that we didn't need to go back and fidlle 
with some factional things; we were just going to do those. 
WC - The phras4t I recall you using, Walter, was, "Let's take the thing and 
shake it down and let the pieces fall to the ones we can agree on. Let's 
get all this evidence and shake it down and see what are the areas we 
really agree on here." 
CB - When was that? 
WC - That was the meeting in Rails' office on Tuesday morning. 
WF - It didn't take long to get there, did it? 
TR - Before we get there, I think that Ham, you [we ] , and I and Caldwell 
did haye lunch. Th~s was about two weeks earlier in the Members' 
diningroom. Ai that point I had no idea that Caldwell wa~ about to 
even consider voitng for impeachment. It was a chance meeting. 
WC - No, it wasn't. That was the day we had the blowup with Hutchinson, 
and Caldwell was not there. 
CB - I wa.an't back to the caucus, but I was back there to lunch. 
WC - That's right. That was the day we: were all upset when Hutchinson said, 
"Let's find out who is going to vote for impeachment." And I said, "I 
don't know how I am going to vote." 
CB - Hamilton and you and I had lunch and Rails came in with somebody and 
joined us later. 
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WC - You were having an interview with Judy Flanders of the Washington fil:!!:• 
TR - No, you are talking about a luncheon at the Capitol Hill Club. 
WC - Yeah. 
TR - I am talking about another one. 
WF - You went out to lunch with all these chicks, didn't you? 
TR - They took me. 
LAUGHTER. 
TR - No, this is another meeting at vhich you [WC] were not present and I 
think it was kind of a chance meeting. It wasn't planned in any way. 
The three of us got tcsether, and this was before I had a:ey inkling 
that Caldwell might consider votir.g for impeachment, and ve just ex-
pressed our concerns. Now there was another meeting over at the Capitol 
Hill Club later. 
HF - Bill Cohen, you, and I were having lunch with Caldwell and I joined you. 
TR - Yes, and I came in late. Over at the Members' dining room. 
HF - Could you tell us why you and Caldwell were having lunch t~-day? 
LAUGHTER 
HF - What was the genesis of going over there together? 
WC - I rarely go to the Capitol Hill Club, not being a member of it, so 
I cannot imagine why I was going rith Caldwell. 
CB - That was in mr palmy days when I could have afforded to be a member. 
'WC - I was filling you in on what had happened that morning. And you were 
pretty disturbed about Hutchinson's attitude--that he cannot imagine 
arr:, Republican ever voting for impeachment. 
WF - You know, there is something I don't think I ever know about at all-
that you all had a blowup with Hutchinson. 
TR - Incidentally, I got the dates on that blowup. I have the whole meeting 
documented, too. 
'tiC - What happBned is that Hutchinson's remarks were initially directed to 
me, and you [TR] were sitting of~ to the right. "Let's find out, let's 
take a little show of hands to show how marr:, are going to vote for 
impeachment." And then Tom jumped in at that point and sud, "Well, 
I don't know how I am--I might very well vote for impachment." 
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TR - Hutchinson said, "I cannot see how any Republican could even consider 
voting for impeachment. Let's get it out in the open!" Ar.d he looked 
around the room. 
HF - I think the exact words were, "How any Republican Congressmen can vote 
to impeach a Republican President?" 
TR - Yes, that's right. 
HF - That agitated me because the assumption was that therefore it would be 
perfectly right to vote to impeabh a Democratic Presidnet. 
IAUGH'l'ER 
TR - Exactly! And he said, "Let's get it out into the open •••• " 
HF - Let it all hang out. 
TR - Yes, that is vaht I was trying to tell him: I might vote to impaach your 
Republican President. 
HF - You [TR] were the only one who spoke out to answer him. I stayed absolutely 
quiet because •••• 
WC - It got pretty shrill and then Wiggins is the one who broke it up. 
TR - Yeah. 
RT - Do acy of yuu recall speculation in advance of our group getting together 
that we::: .. were likely to get together and that there might be a bi-partisan 
group emerging? I had it in my mind there was speculation. 
WF - There was press speculation to that effect. 
RT - In advance or my ever hearing about any group meeting, maybe a week in 
advance? 
CB - I have some references here [notes]. Rails and Walter anc I talking 
in the comnittee room. Rails wa.l.."cing out with me and said, "You know, 
you and I and Walter got this thing in our hands." That is just about 
the way he put it. And then we started speculating on which way 
everybody was going, and that was just before we met on Tuesday morning. 
',IF - I believe it was simply inevitable that the center coalesced, and we 
were foreed to do it when we did by time. Like everything else here, 
we deal in deadlines. And it was gettin' so that there wasn't any 
time le.rt. So we backed arr a deadline and it happened that it was 
Tuesday morning that we got together. 
HF - I don't recall the speculation that we would get together. But you 
recall that it was anound this time-it must have been on the 16th, 
17th, or 18th-that Timemagazine saw fit to take a photograph on the 
Capitol steps which included Henry Smith •••• 
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TR - And McClory~• • •five 1!-""publicans. 
HF - These seemed to be \. 1•e undecideds. 
WF - How did they every l\\lt Henry into ta.at categocy? I would never have 
dreamed that he wci~ l ..: vote for impeachment. 
TR - Because of Cambodi& · He bad expressed reservations abou':. that. You 
know, Henry was Ph ~ tng it very close to the vest. I thought he was 
much more likely t c. \)e with us than Caldwell. Just for one reason: 
I thought Caldwell 11 '\d such an impossible political position down there 
that he justcouldn' \. afford under any circumstances. That's why when 
you [D.5] interview~ ,, me I told you that I thought it was courageous 
of him. ' 
JM - I feel just ~ike W'q \ ~.er. I said in ~ initial interview that I 1a;ew . 
that were going to "'~et. It was inevitable. Even though we hadn· t heard 1.t 
discussed, I knew w~ were going to meet. r guess it was the fact t~at 
the press was hou.nct I \i.g so closely probab 1y contributed to our meeting 
late, because had Wq gotten together to start talking a little bit 
earlier, we would h"' t-e been •••• 
TR - Right. 
JM - So, as Walter says, •.-hen the time came, and the time had come, or we 
just weeen't going 1-n be able to. 
CB - You know it was jll:l l- gratuitous that Larry Hogan made his statement 
when he did because 1.t was about to blow our cover completely as far 
as the press was CGJ\~erned. And it was relegated to a pretty small 
report in the paper I as a result of his statement-which I think was 
pretty good, becarui~ t hey could harass the heck out of you. 
JM - Related to the tho1~~lt t you gave about having this thing in our hands. 
I remember Walter ljfl}f I on numerows occasions di3cu.ssing the burden 
that was on us-, kn.G ►q_ng that we ••• that it was in our hands. 
WF - I know that Ra7 anQ -tim had it to~every time we would go over to 
vote or to a caucw. , all the go:is would get arOttnd us and say, "What 
is going on there? Ile are looking to you three to tell us. We 
don't want to hear l-hese other Democrats, but you three." I think 
we all got our egos 8trllt ut> a lot in this period and it is perfectly 
natural. I figure <! ~. here were at least 40 or 50 southern Democrats, 
that if we three vot ~d t08ether, would follow what we did and be able 
to cover themselves ltp in what the Southerners on the conmi.ttee did. 
JM - We expressed that Yl ~w during that time when we discussed those numbers. 
HF - I think one of the qHngs that really gave me an extra burden was that 
you knew there we-re i certain number of people, maybe 10, maybe 15, 
who really co1;1Id be ~omewhat influenced by your decision, and this 
could be critical. 
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iiF - I think this was part of the i!Il!Dense burden that we were carrying in 
that period of time, because you Republicans had the same thing. You 
would vote for impeachment and thereby make it legitimate !or every .on 
of a Republican to look at it closely. Rails, you are out there in 
the midwest, Ham and Bill up East, and you, Bill, a first-termer at 
that time, and you, Ham, your dad was a Congressman and a r:oted Con-
serva,tive. Everybody had adifferent kind of burden that they were 
carrying, but it was not just your own bulk that you were really in 
control of, but a whole lot of things on top o! yours. 
HF - Bill Cohen has remained silent, but we met every Wednesday eTening 
with the Wednesday group which at htat time was some 33 members, I 
think. The normal practice was everybody' contributing to the dis-
cussion, but that was put aside for a much more detailed report on 
what happened in the intervening week, and Bill had the labor there 
to keep the group abreast, so that they were pretty well informed. 
WC - They were informed. But I will tell 7ou what the problem vas. Walter, 
you point to me-I carried very little weight bascia.lly, no matter what 
I voted. It would have little impact, except maybe on a few of the 
younger members in the Wednesday group. That vus the ha.rd reality, so 
far as I was concerned, and if I was to be acy part of this, I had 
to somehow hold Rails •••• 
LAUGHTER 
TR - You know something? He never treated me · better and he hasn't since 
either. You were pretty nice to me all during those troubled days. 
WF - They all gave us a wide berth during that period of time, d.idn 't they? 
Even yesterday, Jack Brooks and I were sitting next to each other in 
the subcommiteee meeting and he said, "I know what you all vere up to, 
Flowers, you bastard, you and those other guys had l°-' of the stock 
and you were voting the whole corporation!" 
LAUGHTER 
'#C - Oddly enough, Tom was not a member of the Wednesday group; Caldwell 
now is. What was important, Tom, about your role was that you came 
in and addressed the Wednesday arc,up after speaking with Sperling. 
That was important, because it was one thing for me to sit around saying, 
"Look, these are what the facts are." Frankly, the Wednesday groui 
was not inclined to support impeachment~ Guys like Bill Frenzel [? J 
said, "What the hell are you guys doing? You're taking too long. 
It's all circumstantial evidence •••• " And he's a fairly enlightened 
modern type. He would say, "You're dragging your feet-you have't 
got a case-you guys are going to put us in a box." It was just 
disbelief at that point. w ·you, Tom, were the one who gave it 
credibility I guess. Tom, you have to verify this, but I recall you 
came in on a Tuesday morning, and your words were, "OK, I have only 
a few minutes, so let me fly with this thing." Then you laid out 
all the allegations which you thought would warrant impeachment. And 
that was a kind of stimulus to that group. "Yes, it is not all cir-
cumstantial, for RAils is in--then it must be more than just Cohen." 
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TR - That morning we didn't make him [Nixon] a part of the break-in or aIT.7-
thing else, but what we did is what we did later: we shoved that he 
had lied. You kmow that was the case against him, he lied and we had 
the facts to document it. 
WF - You all had a lot more scheduled meetings than we did. I reDember one, 
Jim, that: just came to ary mind then. Ray, I think you were there, too. 
Southern Democrats were oragnized thru that little research organization. 
Nobody was hardly there but there were 8 or 9 guy-s that were in a 
boxed up time frame with the Totes going on. iie were in some meeting 
room in RAyburn and they all wanted us to tell them what was going on, 
and we kind of put them on notice that there was a distinct possibility 
that the President of the U.S. was going to be impeached by our vote 
as well as by the Waldies and Drinans-and I think it started them just 
that quiakly to think most seriously then. 
TR - Can I just add one thing that I think is very significant as far as the 
Republicans an concerned? I think it helped us, and certainl1 gave me 
some support, that I was __ Jtl~~ting with George Bush, the Republican 
National chairman from the veey· inception and keeping him informed, and 
I think that helped to moderate his position. And I final iy started 
meeting with 'ffl1' .friend, Bob Michael, who is now the Whip, to tell him 
what I thought and where there were problems. I met twice with John 
Rhodes. He had fina.l.ly a case of laryngitis, because he didnt 't want 
to talk. All of a sudden, he was worrying. But I don't know if that 
helped us, because we had a communications problem. 
WC - Tom, I think the members on our side were always fearful that you might 
go for imreachment, and what that would mean on the floor. The whole 
st~tegy vas to kind of hold you in line, isolate me, and 1c.nd of 
discredit me once that was done. 
TR - And Ham too. They were a little worried about him, too. 
WC - That's right. 
HF - But yuu must remember that none of the Members spoke to me about that. 
The closest I got to Rhodes was the series of leadership meetings we had 
starting back in April. 
RT - We sure had no pressure •••• 
TR - There was very little external pressure from any of our colleagues, 
even from the White House. I didn't get any from the White House. 
~C - The pressure was different, it was peer pressure, Tom. I disagree w±th 
you about the meetings-I didn't find them to be very beneficial at all, 
with the leadership sitting around a table and say, "OK, guy-s, what's 
happening? Then have Hutchinson burp his way thru the meeting-that was 
pretty gross. LAUGHTER. And sit around and have Sandman carrying on, 
and then say, "Well, gee, whose left here, no one is speaking up." No 
one whould really raise their voices except one guy, Wiley Mayne, who 
said something in one meeting where Rhodes had said, "Let's not get into 
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iiC - this whole personal tax thing." Mayne said, "Well, wait a :ninute, 
if there is fraud in the taxes,. that would clearly be an :_mpeachable 
offense." That was said in one of the early meeings. Beyond that, 
no one got up and raised their hands and said, "Wait a minute, I thimk 
he has done something wrong." 
HF - I think it was obvious from our silence that those who c..id speak were 
not speaking for all of us and I think that Rhodes at least kept loose 
as a result of those meei.ings. I agree with you, we did :1ot speak out. 
WC - The purpose was to pull us in rith a kind of herd instinct. 
i1iF - Let me ask this, you guys: how many of your · colleagues on the Republican 
side did you think were in their own way in and in their mm mind committed 
against impeachment, regard.less of what the evidence would have shown? 
TR - That is a doggone tough question to aak, because what you are asking 
us to do •••• The evidence we had obviously satisfied us, but I would 
almost guess that had we the June 23rd tape, the one that came out 
after the fact, and after the whole momentum was in our direction, it 
would not have made much difference to some guys. Would they have come 
along even then? I don't think so. That June 23rd tape by itself did 
not make that much difference. 
fili' - I hadn't thought of that. Well, all of them fell in ai'te:::- the fact. 
Let us say if the June 23rd tape had been lost in the other evidence, 
the so-called smoking gun, had been lost in the other ev:.dence, just a 
part of it, rather than singled out after the fact, as the vay it came 
to us, I'm not sure •••• 
',iC - I think it would have been rationalized away just like everything else 
that came out. 
CB - It might have brought along one or two others. It was an obTious 
prevarication that he got himself" into that shape. You know ·that the 
President way lying, and here he is now - they had no choice. But ii" 
they had not put themselves out on that limb by hanging themselves so 
much on those smoking guns.... I think you' re right, Bill, there are a 
lot of them still rationalizing themselves. 
'iC - I thought thru this whole thing, and take the March 21 tape. Their 
whole thrust. was this is the .first time that the President really had 
aey knowledge and was starting to get into it. People like o• Brien 
would come in and testify, "I talked to Kleindiest out in SanClemente 
in April, '73 , and it appeared to me that this is the first time he had 
arry knowledge about all this." We were just. getting into it and then 
McClory would say, "Well, accourding to your testimoey today, this 
is the first time that Ehrlichman had any awareness of all this," and 
O'Brien said, "Yes, of cOUMe." And the transe?'ipt was sitting there 
in front of O'Brien. But it is this kind of attitude that could 
rationalize anything away, as lor.g as they had time to think about it. 
You could even take the March 21 tape, and by the afternoon session 
change that around and "it is not altogether clear." 
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CB - Besides, it is not admissable evidence. 
~ - To support t :;....t, I th.ink that 'riiggi;is a.t""ld I .-a?e t. he or,~ :. ·110 members 
of the committee who were present at a meeting after the vote, between 
then and the release of the June 23rd tape, in Rhodes' office with a 
peculiar group. It was just a group of Republicans, not j~ the lead-
ership, and we were talking at that time about having meetings with the 
Republican memebers in the next couple of weeks before the proceedings 
started in the full House. Wiggins kept referring only' to the March 21 
per.iod or after, and I think at another time he referred to Dick Cates' 
analysis of the events of June and July as only a theory-. 
TR - Yeah, only a theory. 
HF - I think you are right: I think he did zero in on the March 21 tape-
it wasn't conclusiTe, it wasn't satisfactory, taerefore •••• 
TR - But there were two different rationales used to get away from the 
evidnce for impeachment. One of them was without a doubt . held by 
some of the gu;ys, that other presidents had done this-in other words, 
the Mayne thesis. Wilie said, "Look, they're hanging just this g,rf, 
and LBJ was even worse. Then the lawyers' argument, by Wiggins and 
Dermis, that there is no real truth. In other words, the admissibility 
in the evident.iary problems. So it was really two different rationales. 
WC - There were three. The atherone was the partisiwhip. I think I may 
have mentinned to some of you-don't take offense, and I'• sure y-ou 
won't-but at one time, we. were getting ready to vote on a procedural 
matter which seemed to me to be eminently fair, and Harold Froelich 
was going to vote "no" on it, and I said, "Harold, this seems to be a 
fair procedure, don't y-ou want to support this~ And his answer I 
think captured the whole sense of tension between the tvo sides as to 
why there wasn't more of a concentration of effort. He said, "Bill, 
it is like the stol"7 they tell of the little girl who wanted to go to 
heaven. The teacher asked the class, 'How man,r in the classroom want 
to go to heaven?' And everyone but Mary raised her hand. And she 
said, "What is the matter, Mary, don't y-ou want to go to heaven?' 
And she said, 'Sure i do, teacher, but not with those bunch of bastards.'" 
LAUGHI'ER 
And that really' was the feeling on our side; they wanted to do the 
right thing, they wanted procedural fairness. 
?R - Another good one! 
WC - They wanted procedural fairness, they wanted to see if he was guilty, 
to convict him of impeachable offenses and so forth, but there was 
that underlying feeling that if there was any other way around that 
if a Democratic Presidnet was sitting in that office that day, you 
could have the same facts, and you wouldn't have any committee heari~s 
going on right now. 
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WF - There is a great deal or truth in that. 
TR - I think so too. 
WF - And I heard it from the other side of' the Hou:5e. I had seriou:5 questioru5 
whether Jerry Waldie and Don Edwards a.ad Bob Drina.n would be there if 
it had been a Democratic President. 
WC - And that is exactly what the tension was on our side of' the aisle; we 
never got away from the feeling that you are really sticking it to us 
becau:5e you have a Republican President to do it to. 
CB - Do you remember when we had the subpoena? The clean-up amendment I 
had and Lat ta got all over me •••• 
WF - Froelich, who is no longer with u:s, was really-I don't want to say 
the comedy of the whole thing-but he was the big, eno?'lftous, little 
question mark that just jumps in at the last minute. I can't figure 
out just how he ended up with us; I don't know. 
TR - I respected what he did, am. honestly I think it took a lot of guts 
because I krmw his district well, and I think Froelich was just finally 
conTinced as a lawyer-I think he's a pretty good lawyer-that you 
better not rationalize too much. There's another thing: I met rlth 
Gene Heller (?] of Cox newspapers, who brought me a release that il'r 
dd.cated that the 1.3 minute transcript from the tape on September 15th 
had been obtained, and that transcript was very, very condemring as 
far as presidential involvement-direct presidential involvement-was 
concerned. It was the 13 minute segment of the 17 minutes fl-om 6:00 
to 6:17. Somehow the Cox papers had gotten a hold of it and. it actually 
indicaeed that the President had not called George Schulz a "candy' ass" 
but he had said something to the effect if' "Baby Blue Eyes," meaning 
George Schulz, thinks he can do that, he is going to have another think 
coming, and we are going to get rid of him, or something li.1<e that. That 
really showed presidnetial complicity in the whole thing. But at that 
point that was not the straw that broke their back; they just kinda 
were again using the rationale, " Veil, that is not really serious 
evidence"- which it was not, and I agreed, but they just kinda discounted 
that. But they did not discount the June 23rd presidential statemnt. 
That was the straw that final.ly did it. That was Dean usir.g the IRS 
files. I had let them know that the September 15th transcript had been 
given me kind of clandestinely, but that I thought it was an accurate 
transcript which we did not have. 
WC - The press leaking material to you? 
LAUGHTER 
TM - Getting back to Mr. Flowers' question about Republicans that would not 
come along regardless. . With regard to the IRS Cox article, you [TR J 
did take two members, I believe, away from the podium into our office. 
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TR - Yeah, I took all of them-Mayne, Wiggins, Sandman; Hogan iias there, 
Dennis, too. 
WF - This vas during TV time? 
TR - Yes, but it was significant, I thought, that here was a purported 
statementthat corroborated what John Dean had said, and was even worse 
in a way. 
TM - The grand jury transcript? 
TR - Yes. 
CB - It also corroborated John Dean's testimon;y. 
ns - Be.fore we move on to aey discussion of the articles and the outline, 
I woold like to pursue one little area-that is that Monday evening 
meeting of yourself [JM], Ray, and Walter. Was that in any way con-
nected with the Democratic leadership? 
JM - I don't remember the precise Democratic caucus, but we kind of laid 
down the law to them, but it might have been the one earlier that evening. 
WF - It vas the one earlier that same evening. 
JM - Yes, it might have been, when we indicated to them that they knew or 
should realize t ·hat we held the key to thins thing and we wanted a 
little understanding of that. We didn't express it precisely that way •••• 
WF - It was pretty damn near precisely that way, because that is when the 
others started looking at us out of the corner of their eye. 
JM - It was going to have to be done our way, with a moderate approach to it. 
I don't know that we named the charges that wewould go along with, but 
we implied that we would not go along with Cambodia and ITT. 
WF - Rodino then said, "Well, can you all get together with some of the 
Republicans and see what you can do?" He said that earlier in the evening. 
He was after the fact; we had already decided that we would get together 
the next morning, but then he put, not his stamp of approval on it, but 
his hope that we would. 
HF - Then Theodore White's book is incorrect in saying that Rodino suggested 
to you that you get together as a group? He came in after the fact. 
WF - I never felt that Peter was trying to twist my arm at all as to anything, 
towards anything. Did any of you all? I think that throughout the 
whole thing, he had a kind or sixth sense about that was really amazing. 
I think he knew he had to be patient; he knew that he had to bring it 
along slowly because he knew he had to have us. 
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CB - Just to set this in the time frame, ray notes indicate en Monday afternoon 
going back on the trolley with Jerry Waldie, he said he vas working on 
a draft of an impachment resolution, he and John Conyers. But I told 
him that was a saaple of what we got when the colllllittee vas about it, 
and that was as poorly drawn as anything I had ever seen and they agreed. 
[?]. What they were searching for was the lowest comnon denominator. So 
I talked this oTer and we got sep!Z"ated, the press vallced into our inter-
view. Then when I got back to the cosmrlttee room, I went back over to 
Waldie and told him we weren't going to have that kind o! presentation. 
That I would like to be involved if they were not going to have that 
kind of presentation. I did not want to vote against impeachment because 
simply it was technicall7 defective. And so after we kicked it around 
for a while, I had determined that Jim Marin and Walter Flowers were 
probably the ones that were working on it, so I vent back to Mann and 
told him I would be interested in following that. Then I went to RAilsback 
and ddiscussed that with him further. As a result of that, we all agreed 
to get together at a definite time, 8:00 the next aorning. 
JM - In reference to what yous aid a minute ago, Ham, about drafting articles. 
Tom [R J had apparently instructed Tom Mooney two or three days Before 
that also to work on some articles because he showed up that 110rning 
with a draft, too. 
TR - Jim, I got an idea to work out of all this. Vouldn 't it be a good idea 
to let Mooney, with the benefit of your copious notes and mine, to 
kind of summarize his recollection about the articles and we can interrupt 
him at any point. Wey don't you try that, Tom? I want 7ou to set the 
stage, so then we can really ny. 
TM - OK. I personally had no idea that any ineetings were going on, frankly. 
I think I remember that on Sunday, before the first meeting in Railsback' s 
office, we first talked about a group. I called Bill Hermelin and asked 
if it wasnt getting down to the short strokes-you know, TV next Wednesday 
and we really don't haTe much i:f' we are planning on the Doar articles. 
And I said, "Have you heard Railsback talking about anybody being to-
gether or a:rr:, group?" He said no, he hadn't, and he said see i! there is 
that in the works, because we have to get moving on this thing. Then 
Bill called Railsba.ek in Illinois taht Sunday afternoon or talked to 
him Monday morning when he got back from Illinois about getting together 
with some people about putting together some viable articles of im-
peachment if that is possible. The next thing I heard was Monday 
afternoon when Railsback came over to me and said, "Listen, we are 
having a meeting at 8: 00 in rrry office." This is Tuesday :naming. "Be 
there." That's all he said. 
JM - At what time did he say this? 
Tm - This was about 2 or 3 in the afternoon. 
TR - I think it was later than that. I think it was after Walter came over 
and suggested we do that. 
TM - And we talked togetherin my office: 8:00, be there, that type of thing. 
He didn't say what it was about ar who was going to be there. 
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TR - What prompted you [WF] on that Monday afternoon to come over to me and 
say, "Let's get our guys together"? 
WF - The time frame. 
TR - White said, I think, that you were asked to do that by Rodino. 
WF - No, it vas the time frame, strictly. We'd all been talking, and hell, 
we were all going public a day and a.i half later. We had to get our 
guts organized[?]. 
RT - The only thing we had is what Doar had put together. 
HF - This is what troubled me, Jim. The perfect story to me was that, being 
scaeduled for television, we voted anyhow on the schedilled start,, 
Wednesdaf evening, and here we are, Monday, and 'Where was an article of 
impeachment? Where vas anything to put before us? I heard about a 
group that involved Edwards, on the Democratic side, but I never knew 
any more about it-that they were writing articles of impeachment. 
But doesn't it seem strange? I! we hadn't met Tuesday morning, we would 
still be there. 
TR - Yeah! 
JM - My recollection of that little steering gorup is not ver-J good because 
there wasn't much said about them then. I just see Pete looking at 'em 
everr now and then; obviously there was Edwards and Sarbanes . and Brooks. 
~ - I think that Pete had the feeling, Jim, that it was going to have to 
emerge from the middle or it wasn't going to fly. Ha had some kind of 
confidence that it was going to happen-no proved direction, just by 
faith. 
TR-- It was just inevitable. 
JM - That group never presented any words, any articles. I met vi.th them one 
time to show them what we were doing. It was either the first or second 
article, I don't remeber which. 
HF - They were not independently preparing anything? 
JM - Yes, they were studying and trying to prepare some language, but it was 
never presented to me, and I never did see it. 
HF - But they did get the word on Tuesday to hold off-that the actual product 
would come out of Railsback's office? 
JM - No, not in that fashion, although they could have been getting some 
word from Dear, vi.th whom I was working very closely, as ve were preparing 
those things. They could have gotten the word in that fashion. 
HF - Sure seems a sloppy way of approaching the thing •••• 
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RT - There are two things that I should mention about the now o! information 
both ways. It relates periphera.1..ly to this. I remember so well the 
statement 7ou [ JMJ made one time, either in a caucus or in agroup 
meeting of a number of Demoerats, that it was going to be crucial 
exactly what abuses were ideirt.if'ied and the language which was used to 
describe what the offenses were-that getting a correct structure together 
was going to be a decisive thing. You did not indicate which way you 
would view it, but that you were going to have that kind of test. I 
followed some of that langauge a.ndon the 19th I used the phrase that it 
depended upon the structure of wonds being created. We were all . 
fumbling for that. I talked with Sarbanes and Don Edwards and other 
people who were on the drafting committee and outlined the same 
concerns that some of · ·.us had - the abuse of power and the obstruction 
of justice. So they were aware, I think, as this was going on of the 
things that were troubling Walter and you and me and others. 
WF - You ought to remember, I think,the Democratic caucus meetings, which 
~-~--· ___ l described to this group as .group the·:rpy sessions where they would 
try to make sure that everybody's thinking the sa.ae way-"a.ren't they 
. • . "-and it was obvd.ous they were trying to bring us t~ along 
with them. The .whole purpose of the meeting vas to get us to go along 
with their way of thinking. 
RT - But we all shared a geeat ll18lJ7 ideas in the prel.illi.nary drafting. I 
know that I did, for I was just noundering, and no structure of words 
had appeared. I was trying to reach some and now we were all appraoching 
it together. 
JM - In effect we were saying that we were not going to accept a:rrr radical 
language or unprovable assertiona-that type of appraoch • 
HF - In other words, ~er we got the Doar book with variations of articles 
or impeachment, you, Ray, and you, Jim, independently or each other, just 
took it upon yourselves to start drafting? 
JM - Mend~ morning I met in my office with Bill m.unt, whom I had borrowed 
from Tom Geddes, a political science professor fro■ Winthrop College, 
who was up here as an intern. 
WF - I think he was vith us at that lunch deal with the Newsday guy. 
JM - Yes, he was. He and I were talking then about dra.f'tir.g articles and 
on Monday mornin.g he and John Laborlcz of t he impeachment staff met with 
me in my office early and I left him in 1111' office all day, scattered &1.1 
out on the noor-.and working on articles during all that day. There's 
where I got my draft of all" article that I had Tuesday morning when we 
met. As a result of their efforts I had started. 
HF - Lucky for us 7ou had that initiative. 
JM - Well, I don't know. 
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CB - Was this the Monday a week after he said "get started on drafting"? 
TM - No, this was all the same day. 
CB - OK. 
TM - He [TR] never did say why. You [TR] did talk about dra_4'ting something 
but never said, "Go dra!tsomething up and let's talk about it." That 
Monday evening he had a meeting, I believe, and I got ho■ 10:00 or 11:00, 
and I was thinking about this meeting and realized that probably the 
subject of the conversation would be the articles. But at that point 
I was just paging thru the Dear articles and made some notes on what 
might be called an article of impeachment. That was the first draft 
of the so-called articles-done paging thru the articles and making 
notes as to what might be something reasonable, knowing lihat Railsback 
had been talking about all this time. 
TR - [Looking at drafts]. Yes, I can identify this, where it says "draft 6." 
TM - That was draft number 1. It's got "Mooney" on top, article one, draft 1, 
July 22. That's a "l" instead of a "6." 
TR - Let me just interject and say I had read Doar' s articles and was very, 
very upset-not upset, just very- critical and I thought they contained 
many allegations that we could not prove. 
TM - We gathered that morning about 8:00, and I really didn't know who was 
going to be there, and under what kind of procedure, i! any, we were 
going tooperate. Frankly', I was a little bit sensitive, net really 
knowing why' I was there to begin with and two, just having a group 
together talking about a very, Tery sensitive topic. 
LAUGHTER. 
TM - Had I, you know, realized that this was special in town. • • • I frankly 
did not take arrr notes at first. There was some general discussion. 
And I, not knowing Mr. Therm.on, they not knowing me primarily, and 
thinking here is this gcy-who is he, taking notes and possibly running 
around giving them away or leaking them or whatever. 
HF - A shift7-looking gey. 
LAUGHTER. 
TM - A mustachioed, long-haired character who may not know what the heck he 
is doing. A:ny'way, that is one reason we don't have good r.otes. 
TR - We were too busy. 
CB - I started taking notes, and I got a little self-conscious about it and 
I looked around if anybody was taking any but Cohen. 
Tape I, pl9 
HF - Do you have notes about the beginning hour of that morning session? 
TR - I don't. 
WC - Ju.st a point of interest: it's ironic that the setting was almost 
identical to this one today in that room. 
All - Yeah. 
WC - I was sitting behind Railsback' s desk with my feet on the desk. The 
Danish weredown at the end of the table on the other side and you were 
over there in the corner, you were on the right side, •••• [indicating 
each]. 
RT - We sat ourselves down here today in the same order without thinking about it'"' 
TR - Except I was right up there. 
TM - But we had the long table there. Bill Hermelin and I ran around to find 
out how we were going to get a table into that room so that we could 
all sit and work fro11 it. At the last minute he was ~aJJin.g the cus-
todian or whatever and we finaJJy got a table. He also ordered up 
some Danish and we had coffee. 
WF - Who paid for that-Railsback? 
TM - You [TR] lllUSt have. It may still be outstaming. 
LAUGHTER. 
TR - Now that you mentirm it... • I remember throwing a Danish to Cohen right 
in .front of me on this table. 
WC - I was gi vi.ng Rails a tough time. My- feet were up on his desk and I sat 
there and ;rou took the Danish at that point and threw it. 
TM - Youmissed and hit the window. 
WC - I think the attitude that we walked in there with was this-we were all 
saying how quickly it kinda boiled down to a couple of consensuses ve 
had. When we were being interviewed afterwards-Jim Naughton did an 
article in the New York Times-we were kind of dubbed the terrible seven, 
remember that? And I said, "No, it is not really a terrible seven, it 
was more like a magnificent seven!" Remember the old, old 110vie where 
there were seven guy-s each representing a different constituency all 
gathered together in this one spot without ever s¢ng a word? The;r all 
kinda lmew they had some kind of job to do. They all met in- thi:, one 
place and there was a consensus immediately. Th!US they were not the 
terrible but magnificent seven. And it was that kind of attitude that 
we had when we walked in and looked around. There was reall7 not all 
that mu.ch to talk about except how do you put it all together in the 
right lang,iage. 
TR - As I recall, we went around the room and shared our views about possible 
abuses. 
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JM - I think 7ou [TR] let off and said this is the vay I see it or something 
like that. 
RT - Yes, you led of!, I think, by getting into the question of censure. 
TR - Censure, yes. But I said there are two areas that bother me-the 
Watergate coverup and the abuse of the sens1.tive agencies. And we 
went around the roo■ and we rea.l.17 had, as you say, a sharing of beliefs. 
We all seemed to share the same ones. 
WF - It didn't take long. We talked about it generally maybe an hour at the 
most. 
TR - Maybe an half hour? 
WF - Maybe not that long. You were talking about language, and vhen it came 
around to my time to ssy something, I said, "You know, ve are talking 
all around the issue: we all are saying we are rllli.ng to vote for 
impeachment." 
TR - Yeah. 
WF - That's when I faced up to it: what the hell.are we doing here? We are 
talking about TOtiDg to impeach the President! 
TR - Right. 
'WF - And if we were talking about voting to impeach the President, in rq 
judgment he was going to be impeached. That was when the hamner hit 
the nail-right there. 
RT - Yes, that's right, Walter. 
TM - Then after the general discussion, we moved into actuall7 thinking about 
language and drafting. 
TR - Yeah. 
TM - And that was when Mr. Mann pulled out his ¢ece of paper, and to this 
day I have not seen that, but I recall you had it. 
JM - T might be able to get it. I had Bill Blunt put together all that work 
and it is buried in my boxes of material and I just did not get a chance 
to get it out. 
TM - And he read his, and then Mr. RA.ilsback said, "Now you have something, 
Mooney, read it." And you [TR] hadn't seen it before, though, _I think. 
TR - I don't think so. 
TM - And I could barely read it, as a matter of fact. Then we went on to Mr. 
Thornton and he read his. 
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RT - One thing, Tom, I don't know if the others in the group are aware that 
I had come to the meeting with Xerox copies of' a draft that I thought 
it 111:ight be useful to circulate and to discuss, and as a result of 
the conversation that occured, it appeared to me that the gr,oup had 
zeroed in on the exact problem areas that were worrying me and I decided 
that it woua.d be inappropriate to pull out a draft that I had worked 
up in rrr:, office to try to say, "Let's start from here." We were going 
in that direction, and so I took them back to the office rith m. 
WF - You showed me that. I was sitting right next to you, and you said, 
"I got this, and I am just going to keep it." 
RT - I went back to the office and told the two people on rrr:, staff whom I 
had worked with that the articles were going to merge into substantially 
that form. 
CB - I find that me110randum that I dictated right after that. I don't know 
if you saw it or not. 
DS - Read it to us. 
CB - Flowers, Mann, Thornton, Railsback, Butler, and Tom Mooney, our co:m1sel, 
and later Hamilton Fish and Cohen came in. We had a brief discussion 
of just generally how we felt about it, and I guess we all kind or 
agreed as Flowers expressed it, if we walk away from this thing, we 
do the greatest disservice to the country. Mann said it is nice to 
find people that are fighting the- same internal battle. Mann, Thornton, 
and Flowers had evidently run together the evening before and had iretty 
much a discussion, as Flowers indicated after a few bourbons, but they 
resolved it. The two areas of real concern are the abuse of power and 
the obstruction of justice. So we had a discussion about that. But there 
is a general reeling that John Doar is overshooting the mark when he 
tries to push us back into April for the Presidlmt's conspiracy. It is 
enough ·that the President's invlovement began on March 21st and he didn't 
pound on the table, but really condoned it. So ve kicked it around for 
a long time. We vere there about two hours altog~her. Thornton is 
stronger than an;r; he seems to think the coverup is continuing and there 
is a series of continuous damage· to the government. Flowers, and we had 
the problem as well, asked if the punishement fit the crime. We all had 
that question. W'e consdiered censure as an alternative, but no real 
sentiment for it. Jim Mann said that the American people werenot yet 
educated to the threat to the American system presented by- all these 
disclosures. Until ve have impeachment we simply arenot going to do 
that. Even Hamilton Fish said that the press simply does not understand 
the significance of this event for they are focusing on the smaller things 
and real.17 don't have the over-all picture. Flowers surprised me by 
saying that even the national media is in for a tongue lashing for they 
are so single-minded in getting the President that they are losing sight 
of the bigger fact that we are dealing rith. A mixed bag-there are 
lot of things that ought to be a!'firmative, that we ought to vote, to 
be talking about. The big question is this: we ought to recognize that 
when we vote for impeachment versus censure, ve will tie up the Congress 
for another six months, for the rest of the year. So we kicked that 
arour.d and kind of' agreed that we are going to strengthen Congress, and 
Congress has to be more responsible beraft.er and particularly the 
Democratic side. 
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LAUGHI'ER. 
CB - And then we had a procedural discussion on the problems of how we will 
vote when it gets to the floor. The group of us recognize that if we 
hang together and work on something together we can control the rules 
and actions on the articles of impeachment, and so we pretty much agreed 
that we are going to try to dra..ft them. Jim Mann is going to vork on 
the area of abuse of power and Ra.ilsbacK and Cohen on the obstruction of 
justice. I guess I'll be working with them and Mooney. So we discussed 
drafts and read them over, kicked it around, and sort of agreed that 
we'd look at it again before that evening. We are going to meet again 
afeer we get thru our meeting tonight. We rejected the possibility 
of inviting Harold Froelich because he had told us that the Republicans 
and he didn't want to improve on the defective articles. F..e wanted 
technically' defective impeachment resolutions that he could ·vote against. 
LAUGHTER. 
We Republicans here feel that is wrong. And we did not invite Henry 
Smith because we felt he was a hopeless case. 
WC - Caldwell, could I interrupt right the·re on the Froelich thing? In rq 
notes, we had a leadership meeting right around the same time, either 
a r ew days before or after, in which Froelich ma.de the statement that 
the Democrats are going to come up with a piece of shit and we a.re 
going to clean it up for them. 
CB - That's right. 
WC - Remember, you said, "Yeah, you [Froelich] would probab'.17 vote for it." 
He said, "Yeah, probably' I will." 
TR - Yes, that's right. 
CB - He said he was tired of us cleaning up their shit. 
LAUGHTER. 
liF - The onl)" show in town when you guys have got a majority. 
LAUGHrER. 
CB - The onl)" note I have is that we did not invite Larry Hogan because we 
thought he was going on his own and wasn't really troubled by the things 
that were troubling us. He had other problems, like being governor. 
D.5 - Let me ask a question here that we forgot in the individual interviews. 
Did the prospect of a non-elected vice-president, in this case Ford, wver 
play acy part in making you a little more hesitant? 
TR and All - No, I don't think so. 
CB - I don't even remember that question coming up. It is about as relevant 
now as it was then. 
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TR - One thing we have not emphasize enough- is the fact we rejected John 
Doar' s and Jenner's articles. I remember that really' interested me 
to the extent that I thought we should write the•. I thought that 
they were guilty of overkill. 
CB - Absolutel.7. 
HF - Don't you remember everybody commenting that we reall.7 had to reduce 
and refine these subsections of &rf7 article down to things that were 
absolutel.7 sure and provable and direct. We used the phrase that we 
cannot have something where you might show three or four pieces of 
evidence that supported it and someone else c011e forth with three or 
four pieces of evidence that confuted it. That kind of thing we just 
couldn't have. 
TR - Sure. 
WF - That is what we meant by the lowest c011J10n denominator; we didn't 
mini.Jnm charge. We meant the absolute minimu:a, iron-clad provable. 
We wanted to document it one at a time. I! we're going to impeach 
the Presidmit, it was going to have to be on some God-awful charge 
he had done something big and enormous and terrible. It had to be 
a telescoped vision rather than a wide-angled camera. 
TR - Sure. 
CB ~ I ·,don't think we wasted five minutes on agency. Everyb0<:f7 agreed 
this sort of thing was out of it. 
TR - I recall a little different from that. I think you could have bought 
superintendaney, couldn't you, or could you [RT]? You were about the 
oru.y one. 
RT - I do agree that it never raised itself to ~ point of consideration 
that the person in line for succession was a non-elected Tice- -
president; however, I do think it would have increased a burden, 
not an unovercomable increase, but it would have increased this 
psychological burden on me, il we had been dealing with the situation 
whereby impeaching the President, a Democratic speaker of the House 
was going to succeed. I think that would have had an effect. 
WF - What if Agnew was still vice-president? What would have that done 
to us? 
CB - That would have lessened the burden some of us had. 
TR - It would have been different. 
DS - Getting back to the point that Walter was making before about the 
lowest coamon. provable denominator. If you were so concerned about 
getting a provable case, how is it that three days later the specificity 
thing caught everybody seemingly- by surprise? 
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CB - I will tell you: John Doar wasn't doing his job and we didn't realize 
it. Jim Mann was being reassured every day by John Doar that they 
were backing us up. I don't e..-en think they knew what you meant. 
TR - Right. 
liF - I think that those guys had done a massive job of compiling and ac-
cumulating a bunch of crap, and they kept hoping that something was 
going to happen, and it did becaW!-e we took charge. That is what 
happened. We took charge. And lost the ball game alllost on that 
first day of the argument on speeilicity. We were in the losing 
bracket then. 
TR - Sure we did. 
WC - Why we were misled is that he~, after all this compilation of all 
this information, and then the dra.f't articles, we said, "Look we ought 
to clean up your mess and we will draft it the vs:r the lawyer should 
draft a provable case as far as an indictment is concerned. 
TR - Yeah. 
WC - We had assumed that since he had done the draft articles on his own, 
he would at least have ·the facts to support them. And that we would 
just take and put it in the right form, boilit down, throw out all 
the excessiYe langllage and notions, and get it down to the bare mini-
lllUII. Ve assumed that he had the basic facts in order to prove his own 
case. 
RT - That's right. 
WC - That's why we were misled. 
WF - Doar would have been in a hell of a shape going before a ~ with his 
case prepared that way. It wasn't briefed out like aey first year law 
school student would take a case to a jury. 
WC - But I think that was the assumption we had: we assumed that since he 
had drafted those articles, he had the back-up material there. We 
were going to clean up the articles so they were short and direct and 
really concise. The facts that he had for his own articles would fit 
the pattern we had established as far as the presentation was concerned. 
TR - To be fair. ab~ it, altho I agree with exactly what you said, I think 
that John Dear at that point was haggard and oTerworked and sleepless. 
But I agree that they were not prepared the way they should have been. 
TM - All that is true, but I think we may be overlooking something here -
his purpose was not to give you a finished product anywhere. His purpose 
was to throw a lot of stuff on the table and let you shake it, ·down. 
TR - I don't think so. 
• 
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JIii - There is one other commendable reason for the lack of organization. 
If I had been chariman of that co11111ittee, I would have orchestrated 
that television presentation for the American people. I would have 
had the evidence laid right out and' preseented in that IIOderate 
fashion. And the fact that it wasn't done is comendable in so far 
as the chairman of the committee and John Doar are concerned. But 
on the other hand, as a good lawyer, as you say, it should ha-ve bean 
colated and correlated with the specific allegations. It wasn't, so 
we were caught short. We did a pretty good job of getting it to-
gether on short notice. 
RT - Great broken-field runners. 
WC - Can I come back to the important point that Tom Mooney made? As you 
recall, John Doar shifted when he finally made his presentation - he 
dropped the position of simply being a non-partisan collator of facts 
and he tried to make a very drama.tic presentation which I thought fell 
fiat on its face. But you remember, Tom, the reaction of the Republcarus 
in the committee who were just outraged at that point when Doar suddenl1' 
was now an advocate and not si.mpl)r gathering the facts? Then when 
Jenner went along with it, they said, "Wait a minute, this is not 
supposed to be." 
WF - ru.d you guys get disturbed by that? 
WC - Our side got definitely disturbed. 
WF - I thought it was highly appropriate that John Dear did what he did. 
WC - Not on our side - our side was violently opposed. 
CB - No, it didn't bother me. 
WC - Rails was a great supporter of Jenner. 
TR - Yes, there was a reaction. It jU3t built itself up. Jenner was a 
great lawyer. 
WC - I said something to the effect - I recall it because it was quoted in 
the Times - that there was a dramatic shift in Doar' s presentation 
from a simply' non-putisan gathering of evidence with a coDlllittee. The 
inference that the Republicans were laboring under vas that he vas just 
going to present this and we:.. vere going to put itall together somehow 
on our own, and i! it shakes down to impeachment, OK. But Doar was 
never to become an advocate, nor was Jenner. And when Jenner vent 
along with Doar, that was the final straw. They said, all right, get 
rid of Jenner. And they canned him, Ila.de him co-counsel with Doar. 
So that was a pretty strong reaction. 
WF - Backing up a little from that - I remember s0111eone saying something 
about falling nat. I thuught the nattest thing I had ever seen fall 
was the so-called reply of St .Clair when he got the floor afier the · _ 
months of John Doar' s presentation. When he slipped in that matter · 
of fact little piece of evidence really prejudiced his ease so 
much! That is when I said, "My- God, the President is treating this gu7 · 
just like he did all these at.her people. ' 1 I couldn't beline that a 
first-class lawyer was going to pull a trick like hhat. 
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TR - That's right. 
All - Right. 
WC - Walter, would you agree that his presentation up to that final moment, 
when he tried to give us that half-edited tran8cript, was brilliant? 
TR - I th01Jght that St.Clair did a very fine job. 
WF - Comapred to those other guys, it had been succinct, more to the point, 
but I kept thinking, well, this guy is doing OK, but he really doesn't 
have a ease. He is working with a bad set of facts. 
JM - Well, he did. 
CB - That was .,. reaction to St.Clair. I! a jury had to go out and come 
back in a half hour, he was in pretty- good shape, but after the7 had _ 
a chance to think about waht he said, he really hadn't said anything. 
RT - I thought it was clear that St .Cl.air did not want to introduce that 
ext.ra bit o! evidence, but he was directed to do so. 
WC - I ban 1n .,. notes here that the reaction on our side when he put that 
in was that it just kind of diffused everything he had tried to 
accomplish. Even Wiggins at that point seemed contused. 
WF - It didn't re~ do that 1111eh !or hia either. It was a low blow. 
.. 
JM - Let's go back to that first meeting for a ainute. I recall two or 
three specific areas o! discussion, one that I specifical.17 recall 
is that Railsback was very strong on the IRS article and on the [? J. 
Second17, I recall that he and Walter expressed great concern about 
the subpoena power contempt as being impeachable grounds. You [TR] 
even went so far as to say that 7ou would vote !or a.motion to strike 
that provision out o! the article, but would support the article,-
whether or not it was striken. You, Walter, eTen y-ou, indicated 
that you would probably do that. 
WC - If' it were included, it would be included as pa.rt or the abuse of 
power • 
HF - What you were going to weave in to article two would eventually' 
become article three. 
JM - And I was OTerruled on it, 110re or less, by John Doar. He and I had 
macy discussioM about it, and eTery time, after he and I would confer, 
he felt it ought to be a separate article. 
TR - Not article two, but one. I wanted it as part or article one. 
l'iF - You know we al~o talked about the whole thing as a single article, 
with the abuse of power - with what became article one being a 
subparagraph of article two. 
• 
Tape I, p27 
HF - That was because the same evidence worked event~ in both articles. 
JM - Let's get back to the very :import.ant point that we sloughed OYer a 
moment ago, this business of direct involvement by the Presidnet -
the agenc7, super-agency, accountability, and so forth. My recollection 
is not very good here, but I think that at that first meeting, there 
was considerable reluctance on the part of the Republicans, in general 
terms, in that group, to apply the theor.y of agency or the extent or 
accountability. · 
WF - You mean "take care that the laws will be faithfully executed"? 
JM - Yes, the action of subordinates. In my own mind I definite17felt 
that there: should be that degree of accountabilit7, and I was just 
drifting along with the group, knowing that ultimatel7 we would have 
t _o conclude that the language that we agreed on would impl.7 that t~ 
of aecountabilit7 and ultimately it did. I don't know if each of us 
made that specific decision on that point with reference to each 
detailed item. In some eases we would say that aeoountability with 
what Peterson did or didn't do, what Ehrlichmn did or didn't do •••• 
WF - I think, Jim, what all of us were thinking is, "Are we going to 
impute a standard to Nixon that nobody had been willing to hang 
Johnson and Kennecy on. I think we all got awa,.. .from that, though. 
We were talking about. a standa.""d for the office of the presidency; 
whether or not the previous guy had abided by that standard, hence-
forth it ought to be the standard.. To that extent I think we did 
move to accountabilit7 and into the theory of superintendenc,... I 
think that was verr much a part of article two - that he has the 
a!fi.rmatiTe duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed 
in the superintendabilit7 •••• 
JM - But I recall pretty strong expressions that we weren't go~ that far 
when we first start ed talking. You may recall otherwise. 
TR - I think you are right. The poilit you raise is very, verr apt and I 
think we ought to get into it in this outline. 
TM - iibat happened at that .first meeting was that kind of discussion. I 
went back to 'flf1' office and tried to work up some language. I then 
worked out different drafts, coming up with the draft that I would 
give to the group. This is draft two, three, and !our, before I had 
something that I thought I could give the Members to work with. 
JM - I think you and I had agreed to connunicate the next few hours; we 
were both going to work on it. 
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